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I.

INTRODUCTION

After a near twenty-year legal saga, the Rubin plaintiffs, survivors
of a grisly terrorist attack overseas, petitioned the U.S. Supreme
Court this term, seeking to attach ancient Persian architectural artifacts in satisfaction of a $71.5 million outstanding default judgment
against the country of Iran.1 The judgment stems from a 1997 suicide
bombing in Jerusalem.2 The eight American Rubin petitioners fell victim to the attack on a crowded pedestrian walkway when three suicide
bombers, belonging to Hamas, an Islamic extremist terrorist organization, detonated cases of powerful bombs packed with nails, screws,
pieces of glass, and chemical poison.3 The Rubins were among the injured survivors of the deadly attack funded by Iran.4
The Rubin petitioners5 filed suit against Iran on September 10,
2003, in Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran6 under (a former version of) the “terrorism exception” to sovereign immunity7 in the U.S.
1. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017).
2. See Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261 (D.D.C.
2003).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 263–68.
5. The Rubins are petitioning the Supreme Court as judgment creditors in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking attachment of a judgment entered in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia fifteen years
ago. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258.
6. Id. at 260–61.
7. It is a stalwart principle of international law that sovereign governments customarily enjoy immunity from lawsuits. However, this privilege is not absolute.
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA or the Act), state-sponsor-ofterrorism governments are not afforded this privilege. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)
(2012).
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District Court for the District of Columbia.8 Iran failed to respond or
appear at any stage of the proceedings, and the district court awarded
plaintiffs a $71.5 million default judgment.9 Iran eluded payment, and
the Rubins initiated attachment proceedings to procure satisfaction of
the default judgment.10 Fifteen years later, however, despite their
multitudinous efforts in federal courthouses across the country, the
Rubins have yet to collect upon their judgment.11
Initially, the Rubin petitioners held high hopes that would change
this term when the U.S. Supreme Court undertook their case to decide
whether the new SST exception to foreign-sovereign attachment immunity (28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)) mandates a freestanding exception.12
Meanwhile, the U.S. Government, for its part, filed an amicus brief on
behalf of unexpected political bedfellow Iran, arguing against the statutory construction that would have granted terror victims such an independent exception.13 Ultimately, terror victims lost their biggest
battle to date when the Court in an atypical ode to FSIA’s greater
strictures sided with Iran and the U.S. Government.14 Now the question remains whether Congress will once again seek to amend the
State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception to attachment immunity (SST
exception), which it has already amended more times than any other
provision in FSIA’s history, in its relentless endeavor to provide terror
victims meaningful relief.
Part II of this Note provides a brief history of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (the Act or FSIA), specifically focusing on legislative enactments modeled to facilitate a legal framework for terror
victims to: (1) obtain jurisdiction and (2) enforce judgments against
designated terror-sponsor sovereigns. Part II examines the role the
federal judiciary has played in interpreting these enactments, examining the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the Act’s terror exception to attachment immunity in the lead up to the Supreme Court’s granting
certiorari.15 Part III argues that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent
holding was a strained textual interpretation that was more plausibly
driven by separation-of-powers concerns. Part IV concludes by briefly
8. The Campuzano plaintiffs brought suit against Iran and its instrumentalities
seeking compensatory damages for pain and suffering, loss of prospective income,
medical expenses, and solatium damages. Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at
272–74.
9. Id. at 269–79.
10. See infra section II.B.1.
11. See infra section II.B.1.
12. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017).
13. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2,
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018) (No. 16-534).
14. Rubin, 138 S. Ct. 816.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012).
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identifying why the Court may have decided it necessary to textually
veil its constitutionally driven decision in the manner in which it did.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act: State Sponsor of
Terrorism Exception
1.

History of Sovereign Immunity in U.S. Jurisprudence Under
Customary International Law

Throughout the majority of its history, the United States has
ascribed to the general principle of international law that a foreign
government is immune from the jurisdiction of another sovereign’s
courts.16 In 1812, Chief Justice Marshall articulated this “absolute
immunity” standard as governing issues of foreign sovereign immunity.17 The Absolute Immunity Doctrine enshrined foreign nations
virtually absolute immunity from U.S. courts.18 When the rare set of
legal facts did arise to pose whether a U.S. court had jurisdiction over
a foreign sovereign, the judiciary would systematically defer to the executive. The executive, would, in turn, habitually request immunity in
all pending actions against friendly foreign sovereigns. This methodical ritual (quasi-rite) held unrelentingly firm, procedurally entrenched
in the nation’s early post-founding years.
By the turn of the twentieth century, however, the United States
invariably sought an economic foothold on the world stage.19 This
newfound global proliferation initiated an immediate and marked influx in Americans’ foreign contacts abroad.20 Arising out of these foreign connections, so too inexorably came an increase in the size,
16. From America’s earliest origins, the Executive Branch has espoused the view
that a foreign state, and its senior officials acting thereunder, enjoys immunity
from U.S. courts where the contested conduct occurs outside U.S. territory. Curtis
A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S. Common Law
of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 218.
17. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812) (“The jurisdiction of the
nation within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.”); see also VED. P. NANDA & DAVID K.
PANSIUS, 1 LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 3.2, at 3-9 to
3-10 (2d ed. 2005) (“The Schooner Exchange is generally considered the case that
inaugurated the doctrine of sovereign immunity in U.S. courts. . . . Justice Marshall indicated that the doctrine of sovereign immunity arises by international
custom; the rule is necessary so that equal nations may freely interact in the
territories of the others . . . .”).
18. See Andrzej R. Niekrasz, The Past Is Another Country: Against the Retroactive
Applicability of the Foreign Immunities Act to Pre-1952 Conduct, 37 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2004).
19. See Phillip Riblett, A Legal Regime for State-Owned Companies in the Modern
Era, 18 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 6–7 (2008).
20. Id.
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number, and frequency of legal disputes therein.21 Ultimately, it was
this unrelenting onset of ever-increasing globalization that served to
underscore the country’s glaring need for a legal framework of judicial
redress.22
2.

The 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

The FSIA, passed in 1976, provides the sole and limited authority
under which U.S. nationals may bring civil suits against foreign
states. By definition, the Act codified U.S. foreign-relations law to
statutorily adopt the theory of “restrictive immunity,” dispensing with
what had become an antiquated theory of absolute immunity.23 The
FSIA delineates the narrow grounds upon which foreign nations are
required to answer in U.S. courts. Formalistically, such narrow exceptions arise when certain predetermined acts of foreign states sever the
general presumption of “immunity” sovereigns otherwise enjoy,24
thereby establishing a judicial basis upon which U.S. plaintiffs can
bring lawsuits against foreign-sovereign defendants.25
The newly employed restrictive theory of immunity meant foreign
states were presumed jurisdictionally immune in U.S. courts only to
those claims involving the foreign state’s public acts.26 Practically
speaking, suits based on a foreign state’s commercial or private conduct were no longer presumed immune under the Act and, as a result,
could be reasonably held subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. In
sum, the Act codified the sole means by which a foreign state would be
21. See Joseph W. Hardy, Jr., Wipe Away the Tiers: Determining Agency or Instrumentality Status Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 31 GA. L. REV.
1121, 1125 (1997) (defining the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity as granting immunity to foreign states and their instrumentalities only for public, noncommercial activities).
22. See Riblett, supra note 19.
23. See Hardy, Jr., supra note 21, at 1126; see also Michael A. Tessitore, Immunity
and the Foreign Sovereign: An Introduction to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1999, at 48, 48 n.6 (noting the U.S. Executive Branch informally adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in 1952 when the Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State, Jack B. Tate, corresponded to the
Acting Attorney General that in future cases the Department would follow the
restrictive theory).
24. Tessitore, supra note 23, at 48 (stating that upon the Act’s ratification, the FSIA
and not preexisting common law indisputably mandates the determination of a
foreign state’s entitlement to sovereign immunity).
25. See 44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 94 (2017) (“The Act sets forth the sole
and exclusive standards to be used in resolving sovereign immunity issues raised
by a foreign state in federal and state courts, and it must be applied in every
action involving a foreign state defendant.”).
26. See Hardy, Jr., supra note 21, at 1126.
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refused immunity and thus be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts.27
The Act was originally devised with four objectives:28 (1) to codify
the so-called restrictive principle of sovereign immunity, as discussed
above;29 (2) to assure that the newly minted “restrictive immunity”
theory would be uniformly applied to all litigants appearing before
U.S. courts;30 (3) to systemize a formal procedure for U.S. nationals to
obtain jurisdiction over foreign states;31 and (4) to provide an enforcement mechanism to procure plaintiffs the ability to collect on successful judgments against foreign states.32 In essence, the Act maintained
the general presumption that “a foreign state shall be immune from
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States”33 but also delineated several exceptions when the foreign state would not be immune.
27. The Act laid out comprehensive regulations governing the U.S.-national plaintiff’s access to the federal and state courts in this country in which to assert
claims against foreign states and instrumentalities thereof. See George Kahale,
III, Characterizing Nationalizations for Purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Act of State Doctrine, 6 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 391, 392–93 (1983),
for a more in-depth discussion on the principles that underpinned the categorical
designations under the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity.
28. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 2 (1976).
29. This principle was adopted by the Department of State in 1952 and has since
been followed by American courts in numerous cases and by the Executive
Branch of the national government. The same principle is reciprocally applied
regularly in lawsuits against the United States in foreign courts. See Michael A.
Rosenhouse, Annotation, State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception to Immunity of
Foreign States and Their Property Under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(7), 176 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2002).
30. See Mark B. Feldman, Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the United States Courts
1976–1986, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 19, 20 (1986) (“Prior to [FSIA’s] enactment, a foreign government sued in the United States would apply to the State
Department for recognition of its immunity. If the State Department recognized
and allowed that immunity, a ‘suggestion of immunity’ would be presented to the
court by the Justice Department. The court would accept that suggestion in deference to the President’s constitutional responsibilities for the foreign relations of
the United States. . . . [But] [i]n fact, these determinations were sometimes influenced, directly or indirectly, by diplomatic considerations.”); id. at 21–22.
31. A plaintiff could attain personal jurisdiction by making service of process upon,
giving notice to, and obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a foreign state or
one of its instrumentalities in an action in a U.S. court. The existence of this
procedure renders unnecessary the former practice of seizing and attaching the
property of a foreign government for the purpose of obtaining personal jurisdiction over it in the United States. Id. at 20.
32. Sean Hennessy, In Re the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: How the 9/11 Litigation Shows the Shortcomings of FSIA as a Tool in the War on Global Terrorism,
42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 855 (2011) (noting that prior to the Act’s enactment, a foreign
state possessed absolute immunity from execution of judgments, even in commercial litigation disputes whereby commercial assets were readily available in
United States whose attachment could function to satisfy the judgment, but FSIA
significantly limited this previously broad execution immunity).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012).
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These primary exceptions included cases where “the foreign state
ha[d] waived its immunity either expressly or by implication . . . or,
where a commercial activity” exception applied.34
As initially enacted, missing from the Act’s enumerated exceptions
to foreign sovereign immunity was an exception for suits against foreign states for acts of terrorism committed against U.S. nationals
overseas. This meant that U.S. courts routinely refused to hear cases
for lack of jurisdiction against foreign states in suits brought by plaintiffs alleging violations of international law.35 However, just one year
before the Rubin petitioners fell victim to Iran, Congress amended
FSIA to create a private cause of action to address this very issue.
3.

The 1996 Amendment—The State-Sponsored Terrorism
Exception

The terror exception to jurisdictional immunity (terror exception),
passed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), sought to eliminate the jurisdictional hurdle that had
prior deprived U.S. terror victims their day in court.36 Ratified to promote the dual doctrinal ends of victim compensation and punitive deterrence,37 Congress sought to promote victims’ rights while
penalizing foreign states’ terroristic support.38
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)–(2) (2012). These exceptions, by practical effect, provided courts with subject matter jurisdiction over such claims.
35. See Saudia Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 351 (1993) (“We hold that respondents’ action alleging personal injury resulting from unlawful detention and torture by the Saudi Government is not ‘based upon a commercial activity’ within
the meaning of the Act, which consequently confers no jurisdiction over respondents’ suit.”); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428
(1989) (granting immunity to a foreign sovereign because violation of international law did not come within one of the enumerated exceptions to the Act);
Princz v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding the Third
Reich’s violation of jus cogens norms did not fall under the enumerated immunity
exception of “implied waiver”).
36. See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259
(2006), for further discussion on AEDPA’s jurisdictional effects.
37. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 303(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1250–53 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
(2012)).
38. The exception was widely passed subsequent to the successful lobbying of terror
victims who were similarly situated to the Rubin petitioners. Powerless to bring
suit against Libya for its involvement in an attack that brought down a commercial airliner, killing all passengers on board, the families of the Pan Am Flight
103 Lockerbie bombing victims were instrumental in bringing about its ratification. See, e.g., Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239,
242 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the bombing, a grievous act of terrorism, “cannot
provide a basis for giving an unwarranted interpretation to an act of Congress
simply to achieve a result beneficial to the families of the victims,” as FSIA, in its
original form—prior to the 1996 amendment—did not subject Libya to the U.S.
court system).
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Thus, the terror exception provides that U.S. nationals injured in
terrorist attacks may bring civil suits against a foreign state or its
instrumentality if the foreign state either committed or provided support for the attack.39 Procedurally, the burden rests on the plaintiffvictim to prove that: (1) the foreign nation was—as expressly designated by the Secretary of State—a state sponsor of terrorism at the
time the act occurred or the foreign state was later so designated as a
result of the act at issue;40 (2) the victim of the act of terrorism was a
U.S. national at the time the act occurred; (3) the foreign state was
given ample opportunity to arbitrate the claim if the claim was based
on an act that occurred in the defendant state’s territory;41 (4) the
foreign sovereign engaged in conduct involving torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material
support or resources for such acts; and (5) the provisionary support
was from an official, employee, or agent of the foreign state acting
within the scope of his or her duty.42 Once a plaintiff has sufficiently
demonstrated these five preconditions, a foreign sovereign will be determined to have effectively forfeited its immunity.
4.

The Flatow Amendment

Five months after the issuance of the 1996 Amendment, Congress
further amended the FSIA with the addition of the Civil Liability for
Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism provision (Flatow Amendment).
The Flatow Amendment43 stated that:
[a]n official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state sponsor
of terrorism . . . while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment,
39. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181,
§ 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338.
40. Sponsors of terrorism are designated by the State Department pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. § 2405(j) (2012)),
section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. § 2371 (2012)), and section
40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2780(d)). For a country to be
designated a state sponsor of terrorism, the Secretary of State must determine
the country at issue has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism by means of harboring safe havens for known terrorists; providing financial, logistical, or material support; or providing weapons for known terrorist
organizations. See State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF ST. (July 31, 2012),
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195547.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/9AG73LGP].
41. § 1083, 122 Stat. at 338–39.
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(A) (2012).
43. The Flatow Amendment was named in honor of Alisa Flatow, an American university student studying abroad in Israel, who was killed when a suicide bomber
drove a van packed with explosives into the bus on which she was traveling
through the Gaza Strip. Shrapnel perforated Flatow’s skull, and she agonized for
hours before slipping into a coma. Having lost necessary brain function, she died
on April 10, 1995, after being taken off life support. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
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or agency shall be liable to a United States national or the national’s legal
representative for personal injury or death caused by acts of that official, employee, or agent for which the courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under section 1605(a)(7) of Title 28, United States Code, for money
damages which may include economic damages, solatium, pain, and suffering,
and punitive damages if the acts were among those described in section
1605(a)(7) [the previous version of the terror exception].44

Of note, Congress clarified that: (1) the terror exception does provide
for a federal cause of action and (2) it allows for punitive damages to
strengthen the legislation’s deterrence factor.
5.

The 2002 Amendment—The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, plaintiffs continued to struggle to bring successful claims
against state terror sponsors. Congress, facing amplified pressure in
its wake, once again sought to prescribe a workable legal framework
upon which plaintiffs could satisfy their judgments against terrorist
states. Congress, in turn, passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
(TRIA), seeking, once again, to mitigate the obstacles victims indeterminately faced in collecting on judgments against state sponsors of
terrorism.45 Namely, the latest pitfall, prior to TRIA’s enactment,
came in the form of the presidency, which could issue waivers at will
to protect foreign-state assets from attachment of judgments under
the FSIA. Accordingly, TRIA undertook to lessen the attachment burden of blocked assets by drastically narrowing the available circumstances46 under which presidential waiver could be applied to protect
blocked assets.47 By this same mechanism, TRIA aimed to bolster deterrence of state-sponsored-terrorism enablers by “provid[ing] a new,
powerful disincentive for any foreign government to continue sponsoring terrorist attacks on Americans.”48
Unfortunately, owing to TRIA’s limited scope, plaintiffs seeking to
execute upon successful judgments continued to face obstacles from
the Executive Branch. The government could routinely quash successful plaintiffs’ attempts to execute against foreign-state assets. Thus, a
considerable number of victims remained unable to collect on their
44. Flatow Amendment, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat. 3009-172 (1996).
45. Hausler v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 845 F. Supp. 2d 553, 563 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
46. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201(b), 116
Stat. 2322, 2337 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2012)).
47. Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 02-C-8643, 2003 WL 25952462, at *7 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 11, 2003) (“A Conference Report on the bill explains that the new Act
‘eliminates the effect of any [previous] presidential waiver . . . making clear that
all judgments are enforceable’ against blocked assets.” (alterations in original)
(quoting 148 CONG. REC. H8722-06, H8728 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2002))).
48. 148 CONG. REC. S11524-01, S11527 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Harkin).
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“successful” judgments.49 TRIA’s reach was further siphoned by the
courts. For example, in Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran,50
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit engendered further confusion on the liability landscape when it offhandedly
determined the Flatow Amendment’s private right of action to extend
solely to foreign state officials, employees, and their agents; hence, not
to the foreign state itself.51 Prior to this ruling, courts had consistently held the Flatow Amendment to provide plaintiffs a private right
of action against the terrorist state itself.52 The D.C. Circuit’s Cicippio-Puleo holding, in turn, engendered much confusion in its immediate aftermath. Congress acted promptly to alleviate the muddled
aftermath, in 2008 unequivocally overruling Cicippio-Puleo and its
progeny. Congress sought to use its final attempt to leave no interstitial doubt to the judiciary that the FSIA conferred a broad-based private right of action for terror victims against foreign terror-sponsor
states, amending FSIA yet again.
6.

The 2008 Amendment—The “New” State-Sponsored Terrorism
Exception

Yet, by 2008 it was clear the terrorism exception had failed to
achieve its intended purpose yet again. This time Congress decided to
begin anew. It enacted a new terror exception under § 1605A53 as part
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, repealing the failed prior version of the terror exception54 and the
Flatow Amendment. The newly passed § 1605A was designed (1) to
overrule court decisions that limited plaintiffs’ ability to collect
against foreign states and (2) to demystify the 1996 amendments once
49. See, e.g., Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 618 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (affirming the lower court’s grant of the United States’ motion to quash writs of
attachment that the plaintiff had attached against Iran’s former diplomatic
properties located in the District of Columbia in order to satisfy a default judgment against Iran for the country’s sponsorship of a school bombing that took the
life of plaintiff’s daughter); see also In re Islamic Republic of Terrorism Litig., 659
F. Supp. 2d 31, 53 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525
U.S. 255 (1999)) (explaining that victim-plaintiffs attempting to seize government-blocked assets were placed in the perverse position of being forced to litigate against their own government—a difficult, and quite frankly, awkward
undertaking, which often dissuaded plaintiffs from undertaking such litigation).
50. 353 F.3d 1024, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
51. Id.
52. See Regier v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2003); Kilburn
v. Republic of Iran, 277 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003); Cronin v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222 (D.D.C. 2002).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), repealed by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338.
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and for all.55 For the first time, the amendments were codified to
clearly articulate that the terror exception stood as its own set of provisions within the Act. In other words, the terror exception conferred a
private right of action for plaintiffs to bring monetary damage claims
in U.S. federal courts against a foreign-state sponsor of terrorism or
any agent of that foreign state acting within its scope of employment.56 Seeking once and for all to guarantee plaintiffs’ road to recovery, the Act also included a provision that would function to preserve
the assets of the foreign-state defendant.57 The new terror exception
also did away with the prior requirement that a plaintiff prove the
foreign state had effected economic control or took in profits from the
property sought for attachment.58 Finally, the dual incorporation of
the new SST exception (to execution and attachment immunity)
granted that “the property of a foreign state against which a judgment
is entered under section 1605A [the new terror exception] . . . is subject to attachment in aid of execution,” in turn expanding the scope of
reachable property plaintiffs could attach in execution of successful
judgments.59
7.

The State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception in 2018

As discussed supra, Congress passed the terror exception to jurisdictional immunity and enacted the SST exception to property attachment immunity with the twin aims of providing terror victims an
avenue for monetary recovery and deterring foreign sovereigns from
supporting abhorrent terroristic acts. Unfortunately, however, even
though Congress has undertaken to amend the terror exception four
separate times between 1996 and the present, undergoing more
amendments than any other exception in the history of FSIA, its dogged efforts have gone unmet. The fundamental objectives that spurred
55. See Debra M. Strauss, Reaching Out to the International Community: Civil Lawsuits as the Common Ground in the Battle Against Terrorism, 19 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 307, 327–28 (2009).
56. See § 1605A; see also Danica Curavic, Compensating Victims of Terrorism or
Frustrating Cultural Diplomacy? The Unintended Consequences of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act’s Terrorism Provisions, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 381, 389
(2010) (noting the 2008 amendments overruled prior decisions that served to
limit a plaintiff’s ability to collect against foreign states by codifying the terrorism exceptions of the FSIA).
57. § 1605A(g)(1) (“In every action filed in a United States district court in which
jurisdiction is alleged under this section, the filing of a notice of pending action
pursuant to this section, to which is attached a copy of the complaint filed in the
action, shall have the effect of establishing a lien of lis pendens upon any real
property or tangible personal property . . . .”).
58. Id.; see also Curavic, supra note 56, at 389 (explaining the amendment to allow
plaintiffs to bring claims against foreign states or agents of that state acting with
their scope of employment).
59. See § 1605A; 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012).

988

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:977

the terror exception’s ratification have gone unheeded. In 2018, most
victims remain without meaningful remedy, still unable to collect on
their “successful” judgment.60 As for the Rubin petitioners, fifteen
years ago a district court judge entered a $71.5 million judgment in
their favor—a $ 71.5 million judgment thus far null upon its entry.
B.

Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran
1.

Facts

On September 4, 1997, three suicide bombers arrived at a crowded
outdoor pedestrian mall in downtown Jerusalem and proceeded to
detonate cases full of powerful explosives.61 The terrorists filled the
bombs with chemical poisons and pieces of glass, nails, and screws in
order to inflict the most pain, suffering, and death upon their civilian
targets as possible.62 The explosion killed five people and severely
wounded nearly two hundred others.63 Of those party to the Rubin
suit, five of the plaintiffs suffered grievous, life-altering injuries as a
result of the attack, while the remaining four suffered severe emotional distress as an effect of having witnessed their family members’
deaths and severe injuries firsthand.64
Hamas, an Islamic militant terrorist organization, subsequently
claimed the attack. An Israeli court convicted the three Hamas operatives on multiple counts of murder in addition to other associated
charges for the operatives’ role in orchestrating the attack.65 At their
interrogation, the convicted operatives and other captured members
from the same terrorist cell provided the Israeli court with a thorough
account of the details surrounding the planning, funding, and execution of the attack66 and confirmed by all accounts that Iran had been
at its helm.67

60. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 480–81 (7th Cir. 2016).
61. Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 260–61 (D.D.C.
2003).
62. Id. at 261.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 261–62.
66. Id. at 261.
67. Id. at 262 (stating that the organization has a close relationship with Iran and
that Iran provided financial assistance and training for the Hamas, as well as
other types of support).
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Procedural History

On July 31, 2001, the Rubin plaintiffs filed suit against Iran68 for
its material role in the attack.69 The district court held that the FSIA
afforded the court jurisdiction over the case.70 Upon the defendant’s
failure to appear at the scheduled hearing and to answer the plaintiffs’ complaints,71 the court held an evidentiary hearing to attain the
necessary evidence to enter default judgment.72 The court found the
plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated73 Iran’s material role74 in the
attack and awarded the plaintiffs nearly $400 million in damages, ultimately reduced to a cap of $71.5 million.75 Thus ensued what was to
become a fifteen-year—and counting76—saga, as the Rubin plaintiffs
traveled the country from one courthouse to the next, consistently unable to collect77 upon their “successful” judgment.
The Rubin plaintiffs first sought to attach and execute against
bank accounts associated with the Consulate of Iran.78 The U.S. Government, however, argued that for the district court to allow for such
68. The Rubins also listed as defendants the Iranian Ministry of Information and
Security (Iran’s intelligence agency), and Ayatollah Ali Hoseini Khamenei, Ali
Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and Ali Fallahian-Khuzestani (senior Iranian officials). See id.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 269–70 (reviewing, one by one, each of the elements under the FSIA necessary for the court to confer jurisdiction and concluding that the plaintiffs,
“[h]aving met all of the requisite elements,” had established jurisdiction).
71. Id. at 261.
72. Id.
73. The plaintiffs met their burden, convincing the court of Iran’s role in the attack
by the requisite standard—“‘evidence satisfactory to the court’ and by clear and
convincing evidence.” Id. at 270 (quoting Elahi v. Islamic Republican of Iran, 124
F. Supp. 2d 97, 108 (D.D.C. 2000)).
74. Id. (“Iran directly provided material support and resources to Hamas and its operatives, for the specific purpose of carrying out acts of extrajudicial killing, including the bombing at issue here.”).
75. Each of the Rubin plaintiffs was awarded $37.5 million in punitive damages, in
addition to the compensatory damages awarded. Id. at 271–74. But cf. Alicia M.
Hilton, Terror Victims at the Museum Gates: Testing the Commercial Activity Exception Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 53 VILL. L. REV. 479, 525
n.4 (2008) (noting Iran’s foreign-sovereign status prevented the punitive damages
award from being levied against Iran, and therefore, the plaintiffs’ final default
judgment award was capped at $71.5 million).
76. On October 17, 2016, the Rubin plaintiffs petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for
certiorari on the issue of whether the new terror exception (§ 1605A(g)) created a
freestanding right. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018) (No. 16-534).
77. Under the FSIA legal framework, plaintiff must first ascertain judgment against
a state sponsor of terror. Then, plaintiff must locate foreign-sovereign property
eligible for attachment under FSIA and bring a separate attachment hearing in
the proper federal district in which the property is located.
78. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. Civ.A. 01-1655(RMU), 2005 WL
670770, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2005), vacated, 563 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2008).
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attachment would impede U.S. duties under the Vienna Convention
and, in turn, interfere with the government’s ability to comply with its
international agreements.79 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia rejected this argument and granted the plaintiffs’ request
for attachment of the bank accounts. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs
found themselves blocked by a prior outstanding lien by another judgment creditor and were ultimately unable to execute on the accounts.
The plaintiffs were similarly unsuccessful in their next attempt to attach Iranian funds held at the Bank of New York.80
Next, targeting Texas real estate belonging to an Iranian prince,
the plaintiffs found their first (and only to date) “victory.” However,
after deducting the significant out-of-pocket expenses underlying litigation, what was left on the table failed to cover so much as a fraction
of the post-judgment interest—let alone to make a meaningful dent in
the judgment itself.81
Discouraged by the failure of their previously ill-fated attempts
and with no other collection avenues for asset attachment in sight, the
plaintiffs set their sights on Persian antiquities82 on loan to the Field
Museum of National History and the University of Chicago’s Oriental
Institute.83 Initially, the plaintiffs set forth to execute on the artifacts
on the theory the collection fell within the “commercial activity” exception84 and consequently was not immune from attachment.85 In 2006,
79. Motion by the U.S. to Vacate Plaintiff’s Writs of Attachment and Execution and
to Vacate the Court’s Op. and Order of Mar. 23, 2005, Rubin, No. Civ.A. 011655(RMU), 2005 WL 670770; see Rubin, 2005 WL 670770, at *3. The court rebuked this argument on the basis that only property that is specifically being
used for “diplomatic or consular” purposes can be excluded from the definition of
a blocked asset as it relates to this issue. Id. at *4. Therefore, the blocked assets
fell within the ambit of the Terrorism Exception. Id.
80. See Bank of N.Y. v. Rubin, No. 05 CIV. 4926 (DLC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10215,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2006).
81. See Hilton, supra note 75, at 495.
82. The Rubin victims registered their seventy-one-million-dollar default judgment
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking to attach
collections of Persian antiquities Iran owned that were on long-term loan to the
University of Chicago’s Oriental Institute. Rubin v. Peterson, 637 F.3d 783, 786
(7th Cir. 2011).
83. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1110–11 (N.D. Ill.
2004); see also Curavic, supra note 56, at 396–97 (explaining the Rubin plaintiffs’
attempts to attach Persian antiquities under the commercial activity exception
after failing to execute on more traditional assets).
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2012) (“The property in the United States of a foreign
state . . . used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune
from attachment . . . upon a judgment entered by a court of the United
States . . . .”); see also Hilton, supra note 75, at 495 (explaining the plaintiffs’
efforts to attach the Iranian artifacts after their attorney became aware of their
existence).
85. In other words, the plaintiffs argued that because the artifacts had been used for
commercial purposes (such as “publishing and selling books in the United
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the museums—joined by the United States—responded in defense,
seeking to protect the Iranian antiquities in their care. The district
court, however, held that Iranian interests could not be raised by
third-party United States.86 It was this development that finally
caught Iran’s attention and elicited it to acquire counsel and assert
attachment immunity.87
Meanwhile, the 2008 Amendments to the FSIA, as discussed in
subsection II.A.6, had recently been passed. The 2008 Amendment initially appeared a breakthrough for the Rubin plaintiffs. The revised
statutory framework put an even greater emphasis on asserting a viable remedy for the terror victim. Recall that § 1605A replaced its repealed predecessor, overruling the Flatow Amendment to (1) expand
the private right of action to encompass suits against actual terrorsponsor governments, no longer just the individuals in charge;88 (2)
solidify a federal cause of action for terrorist victims;89 and (3) hold
liable current or prior designated state sponsors of terrorism—as well
as states’ officials, employees, or agents acting within their official
scope—for money damages.90 In turn, the Rubin plaintiffs, wishing to
take advantage of the Act’s beneficial new provisions, refiled their
suit, moving to convert their existing judgment under the old terror
exception into an altered judgment91 under the new § 1605A terror
exception.92
Meanwhile, as the Rubin plaintiffs continued to seek execution
judgment against the Iranian antiquities, currently on loan to the
University of Chicago and the Field Museum of Natural History, Iran

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

92.

States”), the artifacts should be reachable property for attachment in aid of execution. See Rubin, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1110–11.
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 436 F. Supp. 2d 938, 945 (N.D. Ill. 2006); see
Curavic, supra note 56, at 397.
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2011).
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) (2012).
Id.
Id. (“[D]amages may include economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering,
and punitive damages.”)
§ 1605A(b) (“An action may be . . . maintained under this section [the new terror
exception] if the action is . . . a related action [that] was commenced under section
1605(a)(7) [the old terror exception] (before the date of the enactment of this
section) . . . .”).
In another unlikely series of events, the same month the Rubin plaintiffs refiled
suit, around one thousand other Iran terror victims—of the October 23, 1983,
U.S. Marine barracks attacks in Beirut—filed suit in the same court, touting a
nearly three-billion-dollar judgment and seeking attachment of the very same
museum antiquities. See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F. Supp. 2d 25,
60 (D.D.C. 2007). A tug-of-war battle ensued that butted the Iranian terror victims against one another—over who should ultimately hold ownership rights
over the antiquities. Ultimately, the Peterson plaintiffs discarded the museumattachment litigation in pursuit of a different avenue for collection. Peterson v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46, 48 (D.D.C. 2003).
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and both museums moved for summary judgment on the basis that
the artifacts were not subject to attachment.93 The defendants’ argument rested on the FSIA rule that all property of a foreign country
located in the United States is immune from attachment unless the
property is exempted from immunity by an enumerated exception.94
The defendants, therefore, argued that because no exception to the
FSIA was applicable to the artifact collections at issue, the plaintiffs
had no mechanism upon which to attach the artifacts.95 The plaintiffs,
on the other hand, argued that exceptions from the enumerated list
did apply, and therefore the artifacts should not be immune from
attachment.96
First, the Rubin plaintiffs maintained that the commercial activity
exception should apply. The commercial activity exception provides
that “property in the United States of a foreign state . . . used for a
commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from
attachment”97 proceedings. The plaintiffs reasoned that because the
museums had put the artifacts toward commercial use,98 the defendants’ property should be exempt from immunity under the FSIA.99
The district court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the
statute, holding that to trigger the commercial activity exception, the
commercial activity must be conducted by the foreign sovereign
itself.100
In the alternative, and of relevance to this Note, the plaintiffs contended that the newly enacted 2008 terrorist exception to jurisdictional immunity, § 1605A, provides a freestanding basis for execution
on the artifacts101 by vehicle of § 1610(g)’s abrogation of SST’s attachment immunity.102 Enacted under the 2008 Amendment,103 § 1610(g)
creates an attachment provision that allows for broader attachment in
aid of execution for plaintiffs with § 1605A judgments (under the new
SST exception). The Rubin plaintiffs therefore argued that under
§ 1610(g), the museum antiquities were subject to execution without
nexus to commercial activity.104
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2012).
Rubin, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
Id. at 1008–10.
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2012)).
See supra note 82.
See § 1610(a).
Rubin, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1011.
Id. at 1012.
§ 1610(g).
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181,
122 Stat. 3 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
104. Rubin, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1012.
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Holdings

The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ interpretation of § 1610(g)
on the grounds that (1) it read contrary to the rule against surplusage;
(2) the plaintiffs lacked support for their assertion that § 1610(g) expanded the scope of attachable property in aid of execution; and (3)
§ 1610(g) was solely intended as a congressional override to a frequently cited Supreme Court precedent105 which articulated that a
government instrumentality’s assets “as juridical entities distinct and
independent from their sovereign” were immune from attachment.106
Subsequently, the court found that § 1610(g) did not provide a new
mechanism upon which the plaintiffs could attach Iranian assets and
thus held that the ancient artifact collections were immune to attachment and execution.107 The court concluded plaintiffs had failed to
provide a basis for attachment of the artifacts and granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.108
The plaintiffs timely appealed,109 and on July 19, 2016, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in full the lower
court’s decision.110 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit took the unusual
move of overruling its own § 1610(g) precedent,111 holding that the
“FSIA provision allowing attachment of and execution against property held by foreign terrorist state’s instrumentality is not a freestanding ‘terrorism’ exception to execution immunity.”112 In other words, it
held that any foreign-state property a terror plaintiff seeks to attach
must also be categorically commercial in nature to be eligible for attachment purposes. Through this interpretation of § 1610(g), the Sev105. See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Banec),
462 U.S. 611, 626–27 (1983).
106. See Rubin, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1013. The substantive and structural pattern of
§ 1610(g)(A)–(E) mirrors precisely the same set of factors laid out by Bancec.
However, § 1610(g)(A)–(E) sets forth the exact opposite conclusion to that of the
Bancec Court. Following this line of logic, the United States, in its Statement of
Interest pointed out, and the district court agreed, that § 1610(g) was enacted by
Congress solely to reverse the so-called Bancec doctrine by putting forth the mirrored set of factors as determinative of the issue of whether an instrumentality of
a foreign government should function legally as an alter ego of said foreign government (according to Bancec—no; according to Congress—yes). See Statement of
Interest of the United States, Rubin, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (No. 03 C 9370).
107. Rubin, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1014.
108. Id. at 1017.
109. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2016); Wyatt v.
Syrian Arab Republic, 800 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 2015); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568, 576 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[Section] 1610(g) is available only to holders of judgments under the . . . exception for state-sponsored terrorism, but it
allows attachment of a much broader range of assets to satisfy those
judgments.”).
110. Rubin, 830 F.3d at 473–74.
111. See Gates, 755 F.3d at 567–68.
112. See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 481.
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enth Circuit Rubin panel overruled the Seventh Circuit Gates panel
and created a split with the Ninth Circuit as to how broadly
§ 1610(g)’s authority should extend insofar as whether it is a freestanding provision.113 On October 17, 2016, petitioners timely filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari.114 On June 27, 2017, the Court
granted the petition, limited to the issue of:
[w]hether 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) provides a freestanding attachment immunity
exception that allows terror victim judgment creditors to attach and execute
upon assets of foreign state sponsors of terrorism regardless of whether the
assets are otherwise subject to execution under section 1610.115

Thereafter, on February 21, 2018, the Court affirmed the Seventh
Circuit in full, holding that § 1610(g) does not provide an independent
basis for property attachment immunity.116
III.

ANALYSIS

The Court’s narrow and textually strained construal of § 1610(g)
suggests that superseding issues of constitutionality drove the Court’s
decision.
A. The Court’s lengthy ode to the historical development
and overarching structure of FSIA evince
separation-of-powers concerns trumped the
statutory text’s ordinary meaning.
It is well accepted that statutory text contains the best evidence of
congressional purpose and intent.117 For this reason, the primacy of
the ordinary-meaning rule is a cornerstone of statutory interpretation.118 When confronted with the proper meaning of a statute, courts
begin their interpretive task by determining whether the meaning of
the statute is clear from the text.119 Only if the court at this juncture
113. See Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 817 F.3d 1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We
hold that [§ (1610)(g)] contains a freestanding provision for attaching and executing against assets of a foreign state or its agencies or instrumentalities. . . . Section 1610(g) requires only that a judgment under § 1605A have been rendered
against the foreign state; in that event, both the property of the foreign state and
the property of an agency or instrumentality of that state are subject to attachment and execution.”).
114. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 76.
115. Id. at ii; see Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017).
116. Rubin, 137 S. Ct. 2326.
117. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012) (stating that
statutes are “creatures of Congress’s own creation” and therefore “the best evidence of Congress’s intent is the statutory text.”).
118. Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (“Statutory
construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the
legislative purpose.”).
119. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (stating that the Supreme
Court has placed a statute’s plain meaning at the top of the interpretational to-

2018]

RUBIN V. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

995

determines the language ambiguous will it proceed forward through
its legal analysis.120
The U.S. Supreme Court in its recent Rubin decision did not look
to the ordinary meaning of § 1610(g) as an initial matter.121 Instead,
it unconventionally began its analysis with a review of the historical
development of FSIA, reasoning that such history would provide “a
helpful guide to [the Court’s] decision.”122 In the eight paragraphs
that followed, the Court attempted to delineate the governing principles upon which it had based its ultimate interpretation of the five
ambiguous words: “as provided in this section.”123 This unusual move
served as an early indicator that factors extrinsic to § 1610(g)’s text
guided the Court’s decision.
The Court’s initial deployment of the broad history surrounding
FSIA’s 1976 enactment as a “helpful guide to [its] decision” was peculiar for two notable reasons. First, as discussed above, statutory text
best evidences Congress’s intent.124 Hence, the Court’s preliminary
departure from the language’s obvious import struck a dubious
chord.125 Instead, drawing focus to the governmental branches’ authoritative limits in matters of foreign sovereign immunity, the Court
eluded justification of its salient detour.
The Court, to hinge its interpretation of the law on factors extrinsic
to the text of the law, would have required necessary means of constitutional avoidance to do so, lest the Court run up against its own Article III power.126 Yet, the Court did not forthrightly predicate its

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

125.
126.

tem pole and that in the absence of ambiguity, the “first canon [of construction] is
also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete’ ” (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449
U.S. 424, 430 (1981))); see also United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997)
(“Given the straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to
legislative history.” (citing Conn. Nat’l Bank, 503 U.S. at 254)).
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 501 (1917) (“It is the dictate of common
sense.”)
See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 821 (2018).
Id.
Id. at 821–23.
See United States v. Temple, 105 U.S. 97, 99 (1881) (stating that courts have the
duty to interpret a statute in accordance with the “natural and obvious import of
the language, without resorting to subtle and forced construction” in order to
limit its effectual function).
82 C.J.S. Statutes § 413 (2018) (“Words used in a statute normally must be given
their usual, natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, in the
absence of any indication of a legislative intention to the contrary.”).
Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803) (“Thus, the particular
phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the
principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are
bound by that instrument.”).
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reasoning on these doctrinal ends.127 Only in dictum did the Court
employ separation of power limits as a “helpful guide” to how “as provided in this section” served to significantly narrow terror-victim’s
pool of attachable assets.
The second oddity in the Court’s employing FSIA’s history to justify its interpretational anomaly is the attenuated nature of the history upon which it so fervently relied. After looking to plain meaning,
courts customarily, if at all, look to the legislative history surrounding
a bill’s passage as a mechanism to garner meaning from ambiguous
statutory terms.128 Here the Court did neither of these things. Initially, it failed to address plain meaning, and at no point did it look to
the legislative history surrounding the passage of the SST exception
and the 2008 Amendments that added § 1610(g). Instead, the Court
scrutinized the contours of the enactment of the original 1976 Act itself through an unusually broad lens.129
The Court drew upon the delicate balance of sovereign immunity
and therein the limited instances of immunity abrogation FSIA sought
to preserve.130 It further emphasized the traditionally limited nature
of such exceptions, underscoring the importance of deference to the
executive in deciding such matters.131 Effectively speaking, the Court
singled out the same cornerstone principles that accompanied FSIA’s
enactment in 1976 as to support the very narrowed interpretation of
§ 1610(g) the Court was ultimately to adopt.132 Parlaying these his127. The Court justifies its decision to “start with a brief review of the historical development of foreign immunity law” as providing “a helpful guide to [its] decision,”
Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 821, but never hinges its actual decision on the separation-ofpowers concerns it goes on to lengthily discuss in dictum.
128. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987) (stating
that “[l]legislative history can be a legitimate guide to a statutory purpose obscured by ambiguity,” but unless a clear legislative intent manifests itself contrary to the statute’s language, plain language must prevail).
129. Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 821–22.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. First, the Court emphasized that it has always “recognized that foreign sovereign
immunity ‘is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States,’ ”
harkening back to 1952 to reinforce that absolute immunity, in its original form
afforded foreign states immunity under all circumstances. Id. at 821 (quoting
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983)). Further, the
Court emphasized, it was the Executive Branch, not the Legislative Branch, in
charge of delimiting the law’s confines. The Court continued that when the State
Department did ultimately allow exceptions to immunity, it was only for those
acts arising out of foreign state’s commercial activities. Id. at 821–22. In officially
adopting this “restrictive theory” of immunity, the Court stated, FSIA sought “to
codify this careful balance between respecting the immunity historically afforded
to foreign sovereigns and holding them accountable, in certain circumstances, for
their actions.” Id. at 822. Foreign states, therefore, continue to enjoy the default
presumption of jurisdictional immunity from U.S. courts, and their property, likewise, the same presumption of immunity from attachment and execution. Id.
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torical principles into a conservative reading of the SST exception, the
Court reinforced foreign-state property’s strong default presumption
of immunity absent Congress’s express prescription otherwise.133 The
Court clarified that § 1605A(a) functions to subject designated stateterror sponsors to the jurisdiction of courts, while § 1610(a)–(b) delineates the circumstances under which such foreign states’ commercial
property shall be excepted from immunity.134
Meanwhile, the Court consigned the broader statutory framework
of § 1610(g) to serve merely as Congress’s intended statutory Bancec
override, which had granted instrumentalities of state-sponsored terrorism a presumption of immunity absent a clear showing otherwise.135 The Court therefore posited that because subparagraphs (A)
through (G) tracked nearly word-for-word the factors the federal circuit courts had developed to override instrumentalities presumption
of immunity, § 1610(g) must, in turn, function to abrogate Bancec.136
The sole remaining issue, the Court concluded, was whether § 1610(g)
did “something more.”137
B.

The Court’s myopic application of the ambiguous “as
provided in this section” language suffers from
various interpretational anomalies.

Once the Court turned to § 1610(g)(1)’s ambiguous language, it
properly determined the most natural reading of “as provided in this
section” to apply to the entire section.138 However, the Court’s construal of how to apply “as provided in this section” broadly, and to
which specific section the ambiguous language might reference, fell
short. Recall that the 2008 Amendment, as discussed supra, added
§ 1610(g) and further amended the FSIA.139 In relevant part,
§ 1610(g) states:
(g) Property in Certain Actions.—
(1) In general.— . . . [T]he property of a foreign state against which a judgment is entered under section 1605A, and the property of an agency or instrumentality of such a state, including property that is a separate juridical entity
or is an interest held directly or indirectly in a separate juridical entity, is
subject to attachment in aid of execution, and execution, upon that judgment
as provided in this section . . . .140
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 822–23.
Id. at 823.
Id.
Id. at 823–24.
28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
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Turning to the text of the statute, the Court concluded that subsection (g) did not serve as one of § 1610’s “express immunity-abrogating
provisions to attach and execute against a relevant property.”141 In
support of its interpretation, the Court cited various textual canons of
construction. First, the Court pointed out that the other provisions
within § 1610 that already serve to unambiguously revoke a foreign
state’s property immunity ubiquitously incorporate the requirement
that such immunity abrogation may only reach that property which is
commercially used in the United States.142 Allowing § 1610(g) to serve
as an express immunity abrogation to property, then, would unlawfully conflate a § 1605A judgment holder’s ability to reach noncommercial property.143 Second, the Court argued that when Congress
intends to abrogate immunity it knows how to do so clearly and it did
not do so under § 1610(g)(1).144 In other words, those provisions
within § 1610 that unambiguously stand to sever immunity either (1)
expressly enumerate preconditions145 or (2) employ “textual markers”
that unequivocally either state the property “shall not be immune” or
are immune “notwithstanding any other provision of law,”146 whereas
§ 1610(g) lacks these indicators. Finally, the Court notated that structurally, § 1610 exceptions that unilaterally abrogate immunity are
narrowly tailored, whereas § 1610(g) is overtly broad.147
Various issues belie the Court’s interpretational reasoning to these
ends. First, the Court provides little by way of justification in its determination that § 1610(g)(1) shall “govern the attachment and execution of property [only where] exempted from the grant of immunity as
provided elsewhere in § 1610.”148 In this vein, it is unclear on what
grounds the Court infers that because “as provided in this section” ap141. Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 824.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 825 (“The Court’s interpretation of § 1610(g) is also consistent with the
historical practice of rescinding attachment and execution immunity primarily in
the context of a foreign state’s commercial acts. Indeed, the FSIA expressly provides in its findings and declaration of purpose that ‘under international law,
states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial property may be levied
upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in connect with
their commercial activities.’ ” (citations omitted)).
144. Id. at 824.
145. Id. at 824 (“For example, subsection (a) provides that ‘property in the United
States . . . used for a commercial activity in the United States . . . shall not be
immune’ from attachment and execution in seven enumerated circumstances . . . .” (citation omitted)).
146. Id.
147. Emphasizing that § 1610(a) requires “certain express conditions are satisfied,”
subsections (b), (d), and (e) only apply to “certain property,” and other abrogating
provisions within the section only apply to assets associated with prohibited financial transactions. Id. at 824.
148. Id. at 823.

2018]

RUBIN V. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

999

plies broadly, other substantive subsections must therefore subsume
this one. This reading is unduly strained. Simply because § 1610(g)
serves to “govern” under what circumstances attachment and execution of property is exempt from immunity does not automatically mandate bifurcation of the cause of action for attachment immunity for the
property itself. Moreover, the argument that other substantive provisions within the section already serve such attachment mechanisms is
nothing more than a red herring.149 Finally, demoting subsection (g)
to this narrow purpose is entirely contrary to the ordinary meaning of
how subsection (g) was tailored to apply to “[p]roperty in certain actions”—not commercial property in certain actions.150
As the Ninth Circuit reasoned, “this section” more plausibly refers
to the other procedural provisions contained within the section,151
whereby subsections (g) and (f) were both modeled to enable collection
on outstanding terrorism judgments, given that both provisions facilitate plaintiff-creditors’ ability to attach blocked and regulated property.152 Historically however, President Clinton waived § 1610(f)(1)’s
application by his then-existing authority under § 1610(f)(3).153
Hence, it reasonably follows that Congress, in enacting a new exception to attachment and execution immunity would have referred to
such procedures that were explicitly drafted in connection with terrorism judgment actions.154
Alternatively, it’s also entirely possible that Congress didn’t intend
“as provided in this section” to apply to § 1610 at all but rather to
reference section 1083 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA).155 “Section 1083 in the NDAA, is titled, ‘Sec. 1083. Terrorism
Exception to Immunity.’ Subsection 1083(a)(1) creates 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605A, and names it: ‘Terrorism exception to the jurisdictional im149. Namely, that subsections (a), (b), and (d) are similarly structured should lend
credence, not uncertainty, as to subsection (g)’s serving an analogous function.
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012) (emphasis added).
151. For example, the court in Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran noted that procedures are contained in § 1610(f) that, like § 1610(g), refer to § 1605A judgments.
825 F.3d 949, 959 (9th Cir. 2016). For instance, § 1610(f)(1)(A) allows for execution of blocked property, § 1610(f)(1)(B) prohibits “execution against property of a
foreign state that has been expropriated from a natural person”, and
§ 1610(f)(2)(A) states that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Treasury
shall make advanced efforts to assist courts in locating property awarded pursuant to a § 1605A judgment. Id. at 959–60. Therefore, an alternatively plausible
explanation is that the legislation mandates § 1610(g) attachment be executed in
accordance with these procedures.
152. Petitioner’s Brief at 4–5, Rubin, 138 S. Ct. 816 (No. 16-534).
153. Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 826 n.6.
154. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 152, at 44–45.
155. Id. at 46–47.
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munity of a foreign state.’ The entire § 1083 applies to both jurisdictional and executional immunity exceptions for terrorism cases.”156
Section 1083 contains provisions that allow punitive, and other
types of, damages explicitly precluded by § 1606 of FSIA.157 Thus, it is
reasonable to assume “as provided in this section” which modifies the
word “judgment” was intended to reference section 1083 and equip
judgment creditors with its wide latitude of execution provisions.158
Meanwhile, section 1083 was intended to supersede § 1606’s injunction on punitive damages. This argument is further bolstered by the
fact that those provisions of section 1083 that didn’t make it into the
United States Code are still listed following § 1605A, and each of
these provisions reference “this section” as applying to section 1083 (or
section 1087).159
In other words, although the Court rightly identified the inherent
ambiguity in the “as provided in this section” language and rightfully
discerned the most natural reading as to encompass a broad reading of
the entire section, its construed application of this finding was unduly
strained.160 The Court failed to undertake exhaustive consideration of
what “this section” should be read to implicate and in turn arrived at a
meaning at odds with the statute’s purpose.
C.

The Court’s narrow construal of § 1610(g) dilutes the SST
exception’s intended clout, contrary to statutory
purpose.

The Court’s conclusion that “as applied in this section” means subsection (g) must utilize either subsection (a) or (b) as an attachment
mechanism effectively establishes that § 1605A judgment creditors
may only attach commercial property.161 This outcome heavily dilutes
§ 1610(g)’s potency so as practically to render it a nullity and directly
contravenes Congress’s purposes in enacting the 2008 Amendments to
meaningfully expand property outlets available to § 1605A judgment
creditors whereby the commercial property pool had run dry.162
Anticipating this criticism, the Court attempted to assuage its narrow reading, reasoning that the addition of § 1610(g) provides some
semblance of additional relief through its abrogation of Bancec. How156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 45 (citation omitted).
Id. at 47–48.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 47.
See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 823–24 (2018).
Id. at 825 (intimating that because subsections (a), (b), and (d) all stipulate that
property must be used for a commercial activity “[t]his focus of the FSIA” must
intrinsically be “reflected within [§ 1610(g) as well]”).
162. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1318 n.2 (2016) (recognizing that
§ 1610(g)’s broad purpose was to meaningfully expand the pool of assets available
to § 1605A judgment creditors).
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ever, given the oversaturated commercial-property landscape Congress sought to rectify, is it far from apparent that Bancec serves
anything beyond the illusory role the Court intended.
Further, the Court’s argument that Congress knew how to unambiguously revoke immunity where it wanted to is unconvincing.163
The Court determined that because § 1610(g) “conspicuously lacks the
textual markers, ‘shall not be immune’ or ‘notwithstanding any other
provision of law,’ ” Congress could not have intended it to serve as a
freestanding abrogation provision.164 First, the Court fails to account
for its own value of hindsight in that Congress is a body of lawmakers,
not automatons. Second, it fails to explain by what logic this duo of
phrases has come to pedagogically entail the sole means by which
Congress may expressly designate property-immunity abrogation.165
After all, the text makes entirely plausible that Congress designated § 1610(g) as an express immunity-abrogating provision, utilizing a congruous textual marker to do so. Namely, § 1610(g)(1) states
that “the property of a foreign state against which a judgment is entered under section 1605A . . . is subject to attachment in aid of execution.”166 Arguably, the direct import of the command “is subject to
attachment” could not be much clearer. Black’s Law Dictionary defines subject here to mean “to make liable.”167 In other words, in its
most literal sense, § 1610(g) prescribes that a foreign state’s property
will be made liable where judgment creditors hold § 1605A judgments.
The Court would counter that such property is only made liable “as
provided in this section.”168 In other words, only where the foreign
state’s property is commercial in nature. But the Court’s own earlier
argument that Congress knows how to speak clearly when it intends
to undermines the Court’s own reading.169 After all, where Congress
intended to denote “commercial property,” it readily did so throughout
the entirety of subsections (a), (b), and (d).170 Thence, there is no
doubt that Congress knew how to insert commercial to modify the
word property where it intended to denote “commercial property.”
Yet notably absent from any portion of § 1610(g) is the commercial
modifier.171 To this end, § 1610(g) utilizes the word property in eleven
different instances throughout the subsection, never inserting the
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 826.
Id.
See id.
28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1) (2012)
Subject, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
§ 1610(g)(1).
Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 826 (“Had Congress likewise intended . . . , it knew how to
say so.”).
170. § 1610(a)–(b), (d).
171. § 1610(g).
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commercial modifier.172 The Court’s reading in effect inserts the word
commercial into the legislation not one but eleven times.173 Hence, the
Court determined that the five ambiguous words—“as provided in this
section”—tagged to the end of subsection (g)(1) affirmatively functioned eleven times to make property mean “commercial property.”
Yet, by the Court’s own logic, had Congress intended to limit
§ 1610(g)’s ambit to solely extend to commercial property, it simply
would have said so. Congress knew precisely how to—and did—demarcate “commercial property” instead of “property”each time it intended to throughout the section.174 Even subsection (g)’s statutory
heading denotes “Property in Certain Actions,”175 notably lacking the
commercial modifier. Needless to say, it is well accepted that Congress
doesn’t “hide elephants in mouseholes.”176
Moreover, that subsections (a), (b), and (d) each serve as “independent avenue[s] for abrogation immunity”177 has the tendency to bolster, not detract, as the Court argues, that subsection (g) also logically
extends to serve this purpose. The broader statutory context of § 1610
demonstrates that each of the other substantive subsections is a freestanding provision. Specifically, only the subsections that are procedural in nature are construed to be read in tandem with other
provisions.178 Where such a referential indication does exist, its subsection counterpart is expressly enumerated.179 Subsection 1610(g),
on the other hand, points specifically to no such other subsection but
conversely tracks the same basic structure as subsections (a) and (b),
adding further weight that subsection (g), too, was intended by Congress as a freestanding exception.180
Finally, when § 1610(g) was enacted in 2008, a foreign state’s commercial property under § 1610(a)(7) had already been subject to attachment immunity for over a decade.181 The Court’s adopted
interpretation of § 1610(g) then rendered the inclusion of “the property of a foreign state against which a judgment is entered under section 1605A” meaningless since such commercial property has already
long since been statutorily mandated under § 1610. The Court reasoned that this phrase was not rendered useless on account that it
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Compare § 1610(a)–(b), (d) (“commercial property”), with § 1610(g) (“property”).
§ 1610(g).
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress, we
have held, does not alter the fundamental details . . . in vague terms or ancillary
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”).
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 824 (2018).
See § 1610(c), (e).
Id.
See § 1610(g).
See Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1232–43 (1996) (adding 28 U.S.C.
§ 1610(a)(7)).
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could “help inform when § 1610(g) will apply in the first place,”182 failing to justify under what logic § 1610(a)(7) suddenly required, after
more than a decade, such “help” and, perhaps more startlingly, failing
to define just how the argument that one subsection will “help” inform
another won’t be later used by courts any time to overcome a Rule
Against Surplusage argument.
The Court’s appeal to FSIA’s broader strictures in lieu of
§ 1610(g)’s legislative history ultimately enabled its reading past Congress’s purpose for § 1610(g): “to subject any property interest in
which the foreign state enjoys a beneficial ownership to attachment
and execution.”183
D.

Separation-of-powers concerns were ostensibly at the
primacy of the Court’s narrow interpretation.

The Rubin Court’s strong emphasis of FSIA’s limitations as expressly delimiting international law’s confines evidences that overarching separation-of-powers issues were at the primacy of the Court’s
decision.184 The Court’s deferential disposition throughout the opinion
to the Executive Branch’s position as amicus curiae underscores the
more immediate inquiry with which the Court was concerned: which
branch’s interpretation should be granted supremacy.185
This was foreseeable considering that legal scholars have long
questioned the constitutional legitimacy of the SST exception.186
Under its delegated constitutional authority, sole power is vested in
the President as commander in chief to govern matters of U.S. diplomacy, including the fight against terrorism. While Congress retains
authority to enact legislation concerning issues of foreign affairs, to
182. Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 827 (emphasis added).
183. H.R. REP. NO. 110-477, at 1001 (2007) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added).
184. See Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 826 (stating that interpreting § 1610(g) to require the
“commercial activity” nexus is consistent with the “history and structure of the
FSIA”).
185. Id. (“Out of respect for the delicate balance that Congress struck in enacting the
FSIA, we decline to read into the statute a blanket abrogation of attachment and
execution immunity for § 1605A judgment holders absent a clearer indication of
Congress’ intent.”).
186. See Curavic, supra note 56, at 384 (“Currently, the courts play a prominent role
under FSIA’s terrorism provisions, arguably usurping the executive’s constitutional power to effectively conduct foreign affairs.”); Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, A
Critique of the Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 34
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 887, 912 (2002) (“The most significant cost of international human rights litigation is that it shifts responsibility for official condemnation and sanction of foreign governments away from elected political officials to
private plaintiffs and their representatives. The plaintiffs and their representatives decide whom to sue, when to sue, and which claims to bring. These actors,
however, have neither the expertise nor the constitutional authority to determine
US foreign policy.” (quoting Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human
Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 460 (2001))).
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the extent this authority divergently overlaps that of the President’s
in matters of foreign sovereignty, the Court has typically held that the
Executive Branch must prevail.187
The SST exception has long been criticized for its hardwired propensity to cause other governmental branches to impinge upon that
territory exclusively within the authoritative realm of the President.188 Therein, it has been construed as improperly elevating private plaintiffs’ interests above those of the Executive Branch in areas
of national security and foreign affairs.189 Such concerns have been
materially validated when the State Department has been forced to
join state terror sponsors, as it did here, in support of their positions
simply to safeguard the United States from breaking its international
legal obligations.190
Specifically, commentators have pointed to the SST exception’s obliteration of the Zivotofsky Court’s “one voice” doctrine, which stands
for the proposition that the country must speak in a unified voice on
matters of foreign sovereign recognition.191 “The SST exception, however, results in a nation speaking through thousands of voices in the
form of plaintiffs lawyers, and federal judges. The disparate disjointed, disorderly cacophony that emerges from SST litigation makes
it difficult for the President’s position to be heard loud and clear from
oceans away.”192
In turn, giving individual citizens the capacity to decide in which
manner to involve foreign-sovereign terror sponsors creates myriad
obstacles for the Executive Branch to have to try to sort through.193 In
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, therefore, the Court found that “common sense
and necessity” mandated the President’s exclusive grant of power over
the recognition of foreign sovereigns, precluding Congress from enact187. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2078–81 (2015) (stating
that the judiciary in resolving an “interbranch dispute” between the legislature
and the executive over a question that surrounds a foreign state’s “international
status” will defer to the President’s exclusive power in this arena).
188. See Troy C. Homesley, “Towards a Strategy of Peace”: Protecting the Iran Nuclear
Accord Despite $46 Billion in State-Sponsored Terror Judgments, 95 N.C. L. REV.
795, 816–19 (2017) (arguing that the SST exception constantly initiates interbranch tug-of-wars through its usurpation of the separation-of-powers doctrine) .
189. See id. at 797–98.
190. For example, in Flatow v. Iran, attorneys for the government were forced to intervene to stop attachment of an embassy building, no longer in use, that plaintiff
sought to execute upon against Iran. Had the government failed to do so, however, and the attachment proceeding been successful, this would have put the
United States in violation of Article 22(3) of the Vienna Convention. Such a
breach would have, in turn, put the United States’ own embassies abroad in jeopardy. Flatow v. Iran, 308 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2002).
191. Homesely, supra note 188, at 816–17.
192. Id. at 817–18.
193. Id. at 816.
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ing a law in direct contravention to the President’s position.194 Presumably then, although it is beyond the scope of this Note to
undertake a thorough analysis of the constitutional issues the Rubin
Court sought to avoid, such separation-of-powers concerns do appear
to have played a central role in the Court’s decision.
As discussed above, ordinary meaning, clear statutory purpose,
and application of the rule against surplusage all strongly allude that
Congress intended § 1610(g) to extend to all property. Likewise, the
position of the United States was unambiguously clear:
Litigation against foreign states in U.S. courts can have significant foreign
affairs implications for the United States, and can affect the reciprocal treatment of the United States in the courts of other nations. . . .
...
. . . Seizing a collection of ancient Persian artifacts on loan to a university
museum presents foreign-policy ramifications that are different in kind from
executing against state-owned property used in commercial activity.195

Therefore, the Rubin Court, recognizing the Executive Branch’s exclusive power in this political sphere and duly recognizing how a broad
reading of § 1610(g) would circumvent that power, construed the language only to extend to commercial property.196 Covertly invoking
these constitutional-avoidance principles, the Court left for another
day the unresolved constitutional issues that remain entrenched in
the SST exception and, meanwhile, left the Rubin plaintiffs yet again
empty-handed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The resounding effects of the Rubin Court’s § 1610(g) interpretation will be felt in multiple directions. Terror victims like the Rubins,
having expended much time, effort, and money over decades reliving
their horror in federal courthouses across the country will remain unable to hold their perpetrator accountable or to attain the relief and
closure their government promised them. Congress’s dogged efforts,
meanwhile, to provide terror victims meaningful relief will go unmet.
Finally, the Executive Branch, for its part, will be required to continue
to insert itself to argue alongside state terror sponsors wherever necessary to ensure U.S. international legal obligations remain intact,
until the Court steps in to determine the constitutionality of the SST.
194. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2095 (2015).
195. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra
note 13, at 1, 11.
196. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 825 (2018) (stating that the
Court’s interpretation is consistent with FSIA’s “findings and declaration of purpose” as well as “the historical practice of rescinding attachment and execution
immunity primarily in the context of a foreign state’s commercial acts”).
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Iran, meanwhile, will remain blissfully unaffected and the SST exception’s main function as a deterrent—a failure.
In light of these practical considerations, and the fact that such
empty judgments against Iran only continue to grow in size and number, next time, given the opportunity, the Court should not evade the
question of the SST exception’s constitutionality. To allow the SST exception to remain in legal limbo will only continue to waste precious
governmental time and resources. More importantly, terror victims
deserve either a meaningful remedy or to be granted the closure to
know when to stop looking for one.

